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We study a positioning game prior to negotiations where each party invests into influential ac-
tivities in order to raise voter support for their preferred bargaining outcome. The case chosen for
our analysis is a bilateral monopoly where a purchaser meets a pharmaceutical firm and where the
two negotiate on the price of a new and innovative medicine. We identify factors that influence on
the negotiated price such as treatment effects of the new and the existing drug, production costs of
the new drug, the price of the existing drug, the marginal cost of public funds and patient group
size. Furthermore, it is shown that the negotiated price, depending on the characteristics of a
political cost function with regard to the influential activities, is influenced by the order of moves
taken by the parties. Regardless of the strategic interrelationships between the two parties, likely
positioning games to be played are those where one of the two negotiating parties acts as a leader
while the rival acts as a follower.1. Introduction
The introduction of the new, sometimes extremely costly, medical technologies represents a challenge for policymakers in the sense
that turning down life-extending drugs becomes controversial. The decision not to reimburse often comes under intense criticism from
patient groups, patient associations and clinicians for example by presenting stories about families taking desperate measures to raise
funds to pay for treatments. The debates are vivid, attract significant media attention, and often narrow through a consistent con-
centration on the negative. Purchasers claim own innocence and accuse manufacturers for unethical pricing (not accepting reasonable
prices), while the manufacturers accuse the purchasers of being unwilling to cover foregone R&D costs. These blaming games appear as
being part of an opinion-forming process, occurring in advance of price negotiations, where both parties invest into influential activities
to affect the outcome of subsequent price negotiations (a positioning game). Such processes are complex and the significance of the
political pressure will depend on the interplay of factors such as media coverage, previously assimilated perceptions and people’s own
daily experiences. Consumers (voters) are often marginally affected by a firm’s practices or regulatory reforms thus having poor in-
centives to be informed about such issues. For this reason, media coverage becomes a way of gaining influence since informing voters
might bring about unpopularity to politicians (Baron, 2003).1 In this perspective, media coverage acts as a link between influential
activities and voter support thus representing a mechanism for facilitating the process of mobilizing consumers.2ess School, NO-8049, Bodø, Norway.
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political economy framework in order to provide a better understanding of the positioning that takes place in association with bilateral
negotiations and how this might affect the outcome of negotiations. Bilateral negotiations are especially important for newly registered
hospital medicines intended to treat serious or life-threatening conditions, drugs that demonstrate a potential to address unmet medical
needs and drugs against auto-immune diseases. The negotiated contracts are typically price or price-volume contracts where prices
typically are kept confidential.3 Recently we also observe a process towards an increased centralization of health care procurement
decisions. In some countries hospitals go together to establish Group Purchasing Organizations (GPOs), while in others the responsibility
is, at an increasing rate, left with national organizations. For drugs not being subsidized, prices are typically set freely (maximum price)
while to be listed for reimbursement, tendering approaches, reference pricing, or negotiations are applied.4 Calls for tender require
available competitors (analogue competition) and are typically organized as price sealed-bid auctions that state conditions such as
contract length, the exact substance and package size. External referencing consists in setting a price cap based on prices of similar
products in other countries. Some apply prices from a selected group of countries whereas others take as the reference the minimum
price observed among a group of countries. In situations with no direct competitor available (on-patent drugs), bilateral negotiations
between pharmaceutical companies and procurement organizations are important.
Since being concerned with how firms and organized groups influence policy-makers and sponsors to achieve favorable outcomes,
our work relates to literature on public procurements, see e.g. Sorenson and Kanavos (2011) and Kastanioti et al. (2013) for the public
procurement of health technologies and Hessami (2016), Dastidar and Mukherjee (2014) and Baldi et al. (2016) for more general
approaches. In the lobbying literature, the links between influential activities and outcomes are modeled in various ways. Early models
applied a reduced-form approach (political influence functions) that maps lobbying into influence (Becker, 1983; Tullock, 1980). Later
approaches portray such activities as transfers (e.g. bribing) or as the provision of information to policy-makers, i.e. communication that
sways decisions in own favor. There are also electoral competition models with campaign funding as a tool for buying votes.5 Several
works apply Nash bargaining models in connection with drugs.6 Pecorino (2002) studies pharmaceutical reimports for a home country
monopolist selling in a foreign market and where price determination is modeled as a bargaining game between the firm and the foreign
government. Wright (2004) presents a multi-stage model of a pharmaceutical price regulation system. Here the regulator and firms
bargain over the subsidies firms are to receive in return for selling their drug at the regulated price. Ramani and Urias (2015) study the
role that compulsory licensing may have in drug price negotiations. In doing that, a model of price bargaining in lieu of issuing a
compulsory license is developed. They show that compulsory licenses can only occur under incomplete information. Marinoso et al.
(2011) uses a model with two countries to analyze how the commitment to engage in external referencing affects price negotiations.
Various cases are considered and the main finding is that reference pricing is preferred by countries having a relatively high co-payment
rate and a low population.7
Our model is set up to characterize optimal negotiations and the strategies of the various parties and explain how such factors in-
fluence the negotiated outcome, i.e. under what conditions is it optimal to await the decisions of the rival (defensive) and when it is
optimal to act before the rival (aggressive). The model portrays pricing as being the result of bilateral negotiations between a monopoly
firm and a monopsony (bilateral monopoly). Thus we are concerned with the price formation of medicines without clear competitors
and our model fits well with national health systems having centralized purchasing organizations. Moreover, we study a purchaser being
sensitive to the pressure that arises from not reaching an agreement and this pressure is a function of influential activities conducted by
both the firm and the purchaser to mobilize support among voters. These investments are made in order to strengthen the bargaining
position of each party.8 In the first stage of the game (the positioning phase), the parties invest into influential activities. At this stage,
the following order of moves are analyzed; (i) the influential activities are taken simultaneously by the firm and the purchaser, (ii) the
purchaser chooses its level before the firm, and (iii) the firm chooses its level before the purchaser. In the second part of the game, the
two parties meet to negotiate on the contract price of a particular drug. In order make the model as simple as possible, the analysis is
carried through by assuming perfect information and symmetric information.
The paper is organized in seven subsections. In section 2, we derive a political cost function. In section 3, using backward induction,
we define the potential gains for the two parties from obtaining an agreement relatively to a non-agreement. Furthermore, we derive the
outcome of the negotiations, defined as a contract price, as a Nash-cooperative solution. Section 4 presents the non-cooperative game
(the positioning game) taking place before the Nash negotiations. Here the monopsony and the firm choose their engagement into
influential activities under different assumptions regarding the order of moves. Section 5 compares the various positioning games, while3 However, in a national health system, since the target groups are well-defined (inclusion criteria), price contracts and price-volume contracts
converge.
4 See Danzon (1997) and Anis and Wen (1998) for overviews of price regulation and Lopez-Casanovsa and Puig-Junoy (2000) for a survey of
reference pricing systems. Garcia-Alonso and Garcia-Marinoso (2008) discuss prices of new drugs and reimbursement by studying interactions be-
tween a pharmaceutical firm and a government when there is a mix between public and private provision of care.
5 See for example Dal Bo (2006) and Gregor (2011) for reviews on the literature on lobbying.
6 Some studies explore interdependencies between political and health factors using median voter models. See Breyer (1995), Gouveia (1997) and
Bethencourt and Galasso (2008).
7 Other bargaining approaches on health care are Clark (1995), studying how to share a budget between two patients, Ellis and McGuire (1990),
where providers and patients bargain about treatment intensity, and Siciliani and Stanciole (2013) comparing different bargaining institutions.
8 Examples of campaigns against pharmaceutical firms are the Association of Retired Persons using media to put pressure on pharmaceuticals to
achieve lower prices (Baron, 2003) and pressure to introduce discount AIDS drugs for sub-Saharan Africa. In our work the focus is both on campaigns
initiated by pharmaceutical firms to put pressure on purchasers and purchaser campaigns against firms (“counteractive campaigning”).
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2. The political benefits of reaching an agreement
The process by which pharmaceutical companies seek public reimbursement attracts significant attention. Both before and after
reimbursement decisions are taken there are heated debates, and we observe media coverage of patients that define formulary ad-
missions as their “the last hope” on the same time as receiving moral support from clinicians and patient associations. The actions taken
and their timing can be understood as being part of a positioning game where the parties, a pharmaceutical firm and a purchaser,
mobilize support as a means to influence the outcome of the subsequent bilateral negotiations. The two parties can be said to invest into
activities to put pressure on each other since the outcome of the price negotiations (agreement or not) triggers support and non-support
among voter groups depending on their preferences for the drugs in question (the new drug relatively to the existing drug). In a de-
mocracy, political decision-makers are typically concerned with voters’ reactions to a particular choice, if believing that such choices
have an impact on future voting decisions.
The arguments presented in the debates suggest that the parties disagree on the size and significance of treatment effects. Patient
advocates emphasize the expected treatment effects for the patient group in question while purchasers are concerned with the possible
negative consequences for other patient groups if granting reimbursement. This disagreement is also a result of the inherent uncertainty
associated with new drugs due to clinical trials being performed for short periods with few participants that again leaves room for
discretion and subjective beliefs. The concept of opportunity cost (and its significance) may be difficult to understand for voters.
Furthermore, treatment benefits of innovative drugs typically come in the form of life-extension possibilities which reinforces the gap
between the purchaser’s valuation of treatment effects through health technology assessments (“the willingness to pay for a statistical
life”) and patients’ own valuations (“the valuation of own life”). This point relates to the criticism of the willingness to pay methodology
for which benefits of projects are decided ex-ante (before the identity of those benefiting is known). The tendency for patients to value
own lives more than the “objective” economic valuation is commonly discussed in the literature, see for instance Broome (1978, 1982,
1985).
In order to formalize our reasoning, let E ¼ Eðe; xÞ represents voters’ beliefs in the treatment effect from the new drug depending on
the two influential activities where e, in the following denoted “lobbying”, refers to the firm’s influencing activities, and x, in the
following denoted “campaigning” refers to the purchaser’s activities. Eðe; xÞ is supposed to be increasing in lobbying and decreasing in
campaigning, Moreover, let C ¼ Cðe; x;MÞ measure the beliefs among voters in the foregone treatment effects (opportunity costs) from
the new drug. We assume that Cðe; x;MÞ is decreasing in lobbying and increasing in campaigning. Furthermore, it seems likely that the
patient group size, M, also might influence voters’ beliefs about treatment costs. This stems from an often heard argument that costly
medicines should be reimbursed only if the target group is small in numbers, i.e. there might exist a “budget-impact” effect in foregone
treatments as the number of patients increases.9 The above assumptions imply;
E¼Eðe; xÞ and C¼Cðe; x;MÞ where Ee > 0; Ex < 0 ;Ce < 0 ; Cx > 0 and CM  0 (1)
Generally, the purchaser’s choice of campaigning, x, could both increase and decrease the marginal influence from lobbying, e,
implying the cross partial derivatives of the functions in (1), Eex and Cex , could be both positive, zero and negative. In what follows we
describe how voters’ beliefs about treatment effects and opportunity costs transform into a political cost function.
Let the voter utility, vi; for the two drug alternatives (i ¼ 0, 1) be described by the following expressions;
v0 ¼ θE0 ωC0 and v1 ¼ θEðe; xÞ  ωCðe; x;MÞ (2)
It follows from (2) that voters are concerned with treatment effects and opportunity costs and have stable and exogenous preferences.
The first expression in (2) defines individual voter utility if the negotiating parties do not reach an agreement meaning that the existing
drug will continue to be reimbursed. E0 is the beliefs among voters in treatment effects from the existing drug, while C0 is the beliefs
among voters about foregone treatment effects (the opportunity costs). The parameters θ and ω represent the voters’ valuation of
treatment effects and opportunity costs, respectively. The second expression in (2) defines voter utility, if reaching an agreement, as a
function of both lobbying and campaigning. It is assumed that voters believe that the new drug is more effective andmore costly than the
existing drug, thus, Eðe; xÞ > E0 and Cðe; x;MÞ > C0 for all possible values of e and x. The voters vary with respect to the weight given to




bε¼Cðe; x;MÞ  C0
Eðe; xÞ  E0  Lðe; x;MÞ (3)
From (3) we see that the indifferent voter is characterized by equality between her relative valuation of the treatment effect
measured in foregone treatment effects, θω ¼ bε, and the ratio between the believed foregone treatment effect and the believed treatment
effect. We observe that Lðe; x;MÞ in (3) has resemblance to the incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER) and can be said to reflect a
subjective ICER. Moreover, the definition of the indifferent voter depends on the influential activities, e and x, and the number of9 This might be perceived as being an ad-hoc assumption but is introduced since the “budget-impact” effect is frequently mentioned in the
literature. See for example the literature on orphan drugs (McCabe et al., 2005; Desser et al., 2010).
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Le ¼




< 0; Lx ¼




> 0 and LM ¼ CME  E0  0 (4)
This means that Lðe; x;MÞ is decreasing in lobbying and increasing in campaigning and the number of patients. Also note that the
cross partial derivative, Lex, given our prior assumptions, could be both positive, zero and negative, i.e.
Lex ¼
CexðE  E0Þ  Eex

C  C0 CeEx  CxEe þ 2ExEcL
ðE  E0Þ2
(5)
This means that the marginal effect from e on the subjective ICERmight be weakened, unchanged or increased as the purchaser steps
up its campaigning x. In other words we do not find any reasons a priori to make specific assumptions regarding the sign of Lex.
Assume now that the relative valuation of treatment effects, ε, is uniformly distributed on the interval ½ε ; ε. From the above as-
sumptions, the number of supporters becomes s ¼ ε Lðe; x;MÞ and the number of non-supporters becomes n ¼ Lðe; x;MÞ  ε:
Additionally, let Y be the number of voters that supports the agreement, s, minus the number of voters that do not support the
agreement, n, i.e. Y ¼ Yðe;x;MÞ  s n ¼ εþ ε 2Lðe;x;MÞ > 0., where Y > 0 reflects the assumption that the opinion among voters is
biased towards reaching an agreement for the new drug.10 Now, we define a voter influence function, b ¼ bðY ;MÞ > 0, where the b-
function is assumed to be positive for all values of Y and M and increasing in the number of voters, i.e. bY > 0: Additionally, it seems
likely that b increases with the number of patients involved, i.e. bM  0. This is because a higher patient group represents a higher
number of people (patients and their next of kin, relatives and friends) that can be mobilized into lobbying (“the mobilizing effect).11
Generally, the b-function reflects issues such as patient group characteristics (age, life-threatening diseases, quality of life), time to next
election and the intensity of media coverage (visibility) that againmay depend on the number of media outlets that picks up the case and
other news competing for media attention. By inserting Y in b, we obtain
b¼ bðY ;MÞ¼ bðεþ ε 2Lðe; x;MÞ;MÞ  Bðe; x;MÞ (6)
The B-function defined in (6) is hereafter termed the political cost function and measures the political burden for the government if a
new drug is not reimbursed. From the discussion above, it follows that the political cost function has the following first derivatives
Be ¼  2bYLe > 0; Bx ¼  2bYLx < 0 and BM ¼  2bYLM þ bM  ð<Þ0 (7)
By using (4), it follows that this function is increasing in e and decreasing in x (see the first and second equation in 7). Regarding BM
in the third expression in (7), it is seen that the first term is non-positive, and represents a “budget-impact effect”, see (1) and (4). The
second element is non-negative and points to the possibility that more patients makes it easier to mobilize individuals to lobby for the
new drug (“mobilizing effect”). Thus political costs might be increasing, independent or decreasing in the number of patients. The cross
partial derivative of the political cost function becomes
Bexðe; x;MÞ¼ 4bYYLeLx  2bYLex (8)
From (8) we observe that the sign depends on the technological properties of the subjective ICER, Lðe;x;MÞ, which again depend on
the properties of the E- and C-functions (see 5 and 6), and the voter influential function, bðY ;MÞ. Since we do not find any a priori reason
to make a specific assumption regarding the sign of bYY , and since Lex is indeterminate, the cross partial derivative (see 8) can be both
positive, negative or equal to zero. If Bex < 0, the purchaser, by increasing campaigning, will reduce the marginal lobbying effect. One
interpretation might be that a high share of voters is convinced about the arguments provided by the purchaser meaning that more
campaigning “takes the wind out of the firm’s sail”. On the other hand, if Bex > 0, the stepping up of campaigning increases the marginal
lobbying effect in this way reinforcing the political costs of not reaching an agreement. Now a more intensive campaigning from the
purchaser can be said to “add fuel to the fire”. Hence, our formalized model reasoning covers both cases where increased campaigning
works to reduce the incentives for the firm’s lobbying, and the opposite, where campaigning stimulates the firm to increase lobbying.
Result 1: It is ambiguous whether increased campaigning from the purchaser reduces or increases the marginal political cost from firm
lobbying. Given Bex < 0; increased campaigning reduces the marginal political cost from lobbying. In the opposite case, Bex > 0; the marginal
political cost from lobbying increases in response to more campaigning. If Bex ¼ 0, the marginal political cost in lobbying is unaffected by
campaigning.10 This assumption may be the result of the debates being biased in favor of the new drug. Media attention seems to work in favor of those benefiting
from the new innovative drug (“the potential winners”) since being the identifiable ones, while the identity of the potential losers (foregone benefits)
remains unknown. Given profit maximizing media, the stories covered, and how they are covered, become part of strategies to maximize the size of
their audience. A consequence may be that reported stories become unbalanced in the sense that some stories are more likely than others and because
only one side of a story get published. Media may also favor particular groups considered as being weak or vulnerable from the perspective of the
consumers of media news (see for example Dean, 2012; Salzman, 1998).
11 Electorate power of the patient group in question is in principle another reason for M to be a positive argument of b(.), however, in practice such
effects are believed to play a marginal role. More important than patient group size, is probably characteristics of the patient group in question.
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It is supposed to be a common understanding (common knowledge) among the parties that the price of the drug will be decided on by
using the Nash-bargaining solution. A cooperative Nash-bargaining equilibrium claims that both parties obtain a positive gain compared
to the alternative where no agreement is reached. If so, both the purchaser and the firm decide to take part in the negotiations. The Nash-
bargaining solution12 is defined by solving max H ¼ ΔWβΔπ1β with regard to the negotiation price, where ΔW is the purchaser’s gain
from obtaining an agreement compared to no deal after having decided to participate, Δπ is the firm’s gain when the parties are signing
an agreement compared to the result with no deal after the firm has decided to participate, and, β is the purchaser’s bargaining power,
0  β  1. Both parties are assumed to obtain a positive gain if signing an agreement compared to the alternative where there is no
agreement, i.e. ΔW  0 and Δπ  0.13 The payoffs for the purchaser in the situation where both parties have chosen to take part in the
negotiation and when there is no agreement upon the new drug, W0, is supposed to be defined by W0 ¼ ½V0  ð1 þ λÞRM ð1 þ λÞ
kðxÞ Bðe; x;MÞ. V0 is the individual utility of the treatment effect of the existing drug, R is the unit price of this drug and λ is the
marginal cost of public funds where λ  0, while Bðe; x;MÞ (defined by 6) is the political cost from not reaching an agreement. Finally,
k(x) is campaigning costs and may reflect resources spent by strategic communication departments to coordinate public relations, to
inform the public and to manage relations with the media. Campaigning costs may also follow from expenditures that arise from the
inclusion of various programs that provide public funding of the new drug, although an agreement is still not reached. Examples are
national clinical studies, experimental treatment programs and various pilot schemes. In addition, we also observe exemption rules for
subgroups of patients with particular characteristics. These initiatives can all be understood as costly investments into reducing the
political costs associated with not reaching an agreement.14 The costs into campaigning activities follow from the positioning part of the
game, and will be the same, either the negotiation leads to an agreement or not. We suppose that the marginal cost is positive and
increasing in campaigning, kx > 0 and kxx > 0:
As most pharmaceuticals are multinational corporations it is supposed that the purchaser’s utility is unaffected by the profits ob-
tained in producing and selling drugs. When an agreement is signed, the utility is defined by W1 ¼ ½V1  ð1 þ λÞPM ð1 þ λÞkðxÞ,
where V1 is the individual utility of the treatment effect from the new drug and P is the unit price.15 It is assumed that the number of
treated patients is the same for the new and the existing drug, where the new drug, in the event of an agreement, will replace the old
drug, and that the purchaser’s valuation of the treatment effect (individual utility) from the new drug is higher than the valuation of the
existing one, i.e. V1 > V0.
The profit of the firm must also be defined. First, if no agreement is reached and the firm has already decided to take part in the
negotiations, the profit will be π0 ¼ A gðeÞ, where A is the profit from selling the new drug in other markets while gðeÞ is the costs of
the firm’s lobbying effort. Such costs may reflect communication activities including the management of relations with media, patient
groups and clinicians and various programs for which pharmaceutical companies provide free medicine to particular patient groups
(“named patient programs” and compassionate funding schemes).16 Such arrangements typically occur before negotiations start and can
be understood as costly investments into raising the political costs of not reaching an agreement.17 However, the firm’s costs into
lobbying will be the same, independent of the outcome of the negotiation.We suppose that the marginal cost is positive and increasing in
lobbying, i.e. ge > 0 and gee > 0: Furthermore, we assume that the identity of the producer of the existing drug differs from the producer
of the new drug. Moreover, the profit in case of an agreement, is defined by π1 ¼ Aþ ðP  cÞM gðeÞ, where c is the firm’s unit cost in
producing and selling the new drug. In order for the firm to make positive profit the unit price must be significantly higher than the drug
unit cost due to the sunk R&D investments costs.18
The gains, for each of the two parties who already have decided to participate in the negotiations, from reaching an agreement, now
become;
ΔW ¼W1 W0 ¼ V1 V0Mð1þ λÞðPRÞMþBðe; x;MÞ  0 (9a)12 See for instance the seminal works by Nash (1950, 1953).
13 Following the reasoning from Nash-bargaining, the potential gains arrived at for the parties are calculated as the difference between what they
obtain by signing the agreement and the outcome if there is a break down in the negotiations. As our model is characterized by perfect and symmetric
information, it follows from our assumption that the parties will know before starting to negotiate that there will be an agreement. This feature is
standard when applying the Nash-cooperative solution in situations with perfect and symmetric information.
14 An NHS example is the use of the Cancer Drugs Fund (CDF) for drugs that have yet to be appraised by NICE.
15 P is the drug cost for a treatment - assumed to be the same for all patients.
16 An example of a clinician initiative is media announcements in terms of “letters of concern”.
17 Such initiatives are believed to put additional pressure on the purchaser on reaching an agreement. It has been claimed that some pharmaceutical
companies deliberatively have delayed the negotiating process by submitting insufficient documentation as a means of creating impatience among
patients.
18 Pharmaceutical companies are typically marketing several drugs but there is no guarantee that the average price for all their products will exceed
the marginal production cost. How much the unit price deviates from the marginal cost depends on factors such as the size of the R&D investments
and the effectiveness of the drug in question. Another question is whether the unit drug cost, c, relevant for our case could be equal or just slightly
above the marginal production cost. This can be the case if the pharmaceutical firm has a strategy to let other purchasers (in other countries) paying
for the investments. We do not pursue this point further in our model. Pharmaceuticals are typically in markets with different drugs and there is no
guarantee that the average price of all products will exceed their marginal costs.
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By using (9ab), solving (10) with regard to P, provides us with the following equilibrium value, P*
P* ¼ βcþð1 βÞ 1
1þ λ

V1  V0 ð1þ λÞRþBðe; x;MÞ
M
	
¼ βcþ ð1 βÞQ (11)
From (11) we see that the optimal price is a weighted average of the firm’s unit drug cost, c, and the net utility gain per patient for the
purchaser from procuring the new drug instead of the existing one, Q  11þλ

V1 ½V0 ð1þλÞR þBðe;x;MÞM
	
; where β and 1 β are the
weights, respectively. When calculating the net utility gain per patient, Q, one must first calculate the utility gain from reimbursing the
new drug, V1  V0, deflated by the factor 1þ λ due to efficiency losses from taxation. Secondly, one has to take into account the saved
resources from abandoning the existing drug, R. Thirdly, obtaining an agreement also means one has to take into account the “saved”
political costs per patient deflated by the factor, 1þ λ.








The contract price is equal to or above the unit drug cost, c, or equal to or below the net utility gain per patient, Q. A binding first
inequality means no gain for the firm (Δπ ¼ 0), while a binding second inequality means no gain for the purchaser (ΔW ¼ 0). If the
purchaser has all bargaining power, i.e. β ¼ 1, then P* ¼ c , thusΔπ ¼ 0. On the other hand, if the firm has all bargaining power, i.e. β ¼
0, P* ¼ Q ¼ 11þλ

V1  ½V0  ð1 þ λÞR þ Bðe;x;MÞM
	
, thus ΔW ¼ 0.20
Note that if the unit drug cost is above the net utility gain per patient, i.e. c > Q, the parties will not choose to take part in the
negotiations since both of them cannot obtain positive payoffs. As the parties are supposed to have perfect and symmetric information,
they will know whether (12) holds or not. If (12) does not hold, there is no point in entering into negotiations and, as a consequence,
there are no incentives for the firm to engage in a non-cooperative positioning game.21
Result 2:Given an agreement, the contract price of the new drug becomes a weighted average of the firm’s unit cost of producing and selling the
drug and the purchaser’s net utility gain per patient from the new drug, where the weights reflect the bargaining power of purchaser and the firm,
respectively.
It is also of interest to evaluate how the contract price is affected by changes in exogenous variables. Based on differentiations of (11),
we find




V1 V0 þBðe; x;MÞ
M

< 0;P*R ¼ð1 βÞ > 0;
















First, it is seen from (13) that when the purchaser’s bargaining power β, is increased, the contract price is reduced, P*β < 0. If the
marginal cost of public funds increases λ, the net utility gain per patient becomes higher that again reduces the contract price, P*λ < 0. If
the price of the existing drug, R, increases, the purchaser’s potential gain from introducing the new drug becomes higher, and this again
increases the contract price, P*R > 0. Increased drug unit costs, c, also increases the contract price, P
*
c > 0. If the valuation of an increase19 When the equation in (10) holds, it is easily seen that the second order condition is satisfied, i.e. d
2H
dP2 ¼ HPP ¼  ΔWβ1Δπβð1 þ λÞM2 < 0.
20 The contract price in (11) can be compared with other pricing rules, for instance the case where the firm is acting as a monopoly and the
purchaser plays a passive role. Then the firm will set a price equal to the maximal willingness to pay, i.e. that all bargaining power belongs to the firm,
i.e. β ¼ 0: Additionally, assuming no political costs in the monopoly case, the monopoly price is defined by Pm ¼ 11þλ fV1  ½V0  ð1 þ λÞRg. Then it
is seen that if the political costs are not too high, i.e. B ¼ Bðe;x;MÞ < Mβ1β fV1  ½V0  ð1 þ λÞðR  cÞg, the monopoly price, Pm, will be higher than
the contract price, P*. Most reasonably, a monopoly price would also imply some type of “political noise or costs” that further increase the disad-
vantages in realizing a monopoly price compared to the contract price stemming from bargaining.
21 As pointed out to us by one of the journal’s reviewers, in cases where no agreement is signed, i.e. where c > Q, the purchaser, unlike the firm,
might have incentives to use resources in campaigning to reduce the political pressure. However, in our reasoning, we have limited ourselves to
discuss lobbying and campaigning in the case where the inequalities in (12) are satisfied. A sufficient condition for (12) to be satisfied is that it holds
for B ¼ 0, i.e. V1V21þλ þ R > c.
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size increases, the price becomes higher if the marginal political cost is positive and higher than the political cost per patient, i.e. BM >
Bðe;x;MÞ
M . On the other hand, if the marginal political cost is negative and below the political cost per patient, i.e. BM  Bðe;x;MÞM , the price stays
unchanged or decreases as patient group size becomes higher.22
Result 3: The contract price decreases with the purchaser’s bargaining power and the marginal cost of public funds while it increases with the
price of the existing drugs, the unit drug cost and the utility gain from the new drug compared to the existing one. It is ambiguous whether a higher
patient group size increases or decreases the contract price. Given an increase in the political cost for an extra patient being lower (higher) than the
political cost per patient, the contract price decreases (increases) for an increasing patient group size.
4. Three positioning games
If each party benefits from investing into influential activities prior to the negotiations, it seems likely that they will do so. Such a
positioning game is here portrayed as a non-cooperative game23 where the purchaser chooses x and the firm chooses e, and where the
price P*, is defined by (11). Note that the forthcoming analyses reveal possible strategic considerations that the parties engage in (actual
choices of lobbying and campaigning) before they enter into negotiations. We first study the case where the parties move simulta-
neously, thereafter the situation where the purchaser acts a leader (firm as follower), and, finally the case were the firm acts as leader
(purchaser as follower).
4.1. The simultaneous game
In the simultaneous game the influential decisions are taken simultaneously by the firm and the purchaser. From (11) it follows that
P* ¼ P*ðe; xÞ, where P*e ¼ ð1βÞð1þλÞ BeM > 0 and P*x ¼ ð1βÞð1þλÞ BxM < 0, implying that more intensive lobbying and less intensive campaigning
increases the political costs and the contract price. The purchaser maximizesW1 ¼ ½V1 ð1þλÞP*ðe; xÞM  ð1þλÞkðxÞw.r.t. x, implying
a first order condition defined by
W1x ¼ ð1 βÞBx ð1þ λÞkx ¼ 0 (14)
where the second order condition, given by W1xx ¼  ð1  βÞBxx  ð1 þ λÞkxx < 0, is supposed to be satisfied.24 The firm maximizes
π1 ¼ ðP*ðe; xÞcÞM þ A gðeÞ w.r.t. e. This implies a first order condition defined by
π1e ¼
1 β
1þ λBe  ge ¼ 0 (15)
where the second order condition, given by π1ee ¼ 1β1þλBee  gee < 0, is supposed to be satisfied.25 It follows from (14) and (15) that the
optimal levels of lobbying and campaigning depend on the voters’ sensitivity to the influential activities (Bx and Be) and their marginal
costs (kx and ge). In addition, the bargaining power of the purchaser (β) and the marginal cost of public funds (λÞ have direct effects.
Optimal campaigning (see 14) implies that the marginal gain, measured as the marginal decrease in the political costs multiplied by the
firm’s bargaining power,  ð1  βÞBx, is equal to the marginal campaigning cost including the funding costs, ð1 þ λÞkx. Optimal
lobbying (see 15) is characterized by equality between the marginal increase in the political costs multiplied by the firm’s bargaining
power ð1  βÞBe, and the marginal lobbying cost including funding costs, ð1 þ λÞge.26 Denote the optimal values of e and x, being
implicitly defined by the solution of the two equations in (14) and (15) in this simultaneous case as (es;xsÞ. If we now use (11), the value
of the contract price can be determined. Denote the price of the new drug in this simultaneous case by P*ðes;xsÞ.
4.2. The purchaser as leader
Given the purchaser as leader, we first derive how the firm reacts to different levels of campaigning. The reaction function, e ¼ eðxÞ,
is implicitly defined by (15). Differentiation of (15) w.r.t. x, yields22 Using (7), it follows that P*M ¼ 1βð1þλÞM


 2bYLM þ bM  Bðe;x;MÞM

. In the brackets, we identify three different effects from M affecting the price.
The non-positive term,  2bYLM , measures the “budget-impact effect” (the less patients being eligible for the drug in question, the less concerned are
voters about the per patient opportunity cost) working in the direction of a lower price. The non-negative term bM measures the “mobilizing effect”
working in the direction of a higher price. Finally, the term B/M shows that an increasing patient group size will mean that there are more people to
divide the “fixed” level of political costs among, working in the direction of a reduced price. Hence, generally, we do not know whether an increased
number of patients increases or reduces the price and this conclusion is valid independent of the “budget-impact” effect being present or not.
23 The outcomes following from these positioning games are non-cooperative Nash-equilibria, see for instance the original work by Nash (1951).
24 It is presumed that W1xx ¼  ð1  βÞBxx  ð1 þ λÞkxx ¼  ð1  βÞ½4bYY ðLxÞ2  2bYLxx   ð1 þ λÞkxx < 0.
25 This implies that π1ee ¼ 1β1þλBee  gee ¼ 1β1þλ ½4bYY ðLeÞ2  2bYLee  gee < 0.
26 It is easily seen from (14) and (15) that the optimal choices of e and x are directly influenced by the values of β and λ. This means that the political
costs, B, and hence the contract price, P*, in addition to the direct effects caused upon by changes in β and λ (see Result 3) will be indirectly
influenced by such changes through the optimal values of e and x.
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Bex < ð Þ0 as Bex < ðÞ0 (16)dx πee
This means that more campaigning reduces (increases) the incentive for the firm to invest in lobbying, when Bex < ðÞ0. In terms of
Bulow et al. (1985), e and x are, from the purchaser’s perspective, strategic substitutes (complements) because more (less) aggressive
behavior from the purchaser leads to less (more) aggressive behavior from the firm. The purchaser now chooses x to satisfy27
∂W1





ð1þ λÞkx ¼ 0 (17)
By comparing (14) and (17), it is easily seen that the marginal gain from increasing x for the purchaser becomes higher whenmoving
first compared to the simultaneous case when dedx < 0. In the opposite case, where the firm increases e as x is stepped up, i.e.
de
dx  0, the
marginal gain becomes lower for the purchaser as leader if compared with the simultaneous case. This means that the purchaser chooses
a higher (lower) value of x as leader compared to what the purchaser will do in the simultaneous case as dedx < ðÞ0. The intuition behind
this finding lies with the purchaser having an incentive to choose a higher (lower) x, in the case where acting as leader compared to the
simultaneous case, in order to force the firm to reduce lobbying.
Given the situation where aggressive purchaser behavior reduces lobbying ðBex < 0Þ, the purchaser, by moving first, makes it less
worthy for the firm to use resources into lobbying, i.e. the purchaser, by choosing a relatively high campaigning level reduces the
efficiency of lobbying (“takes the wind out of the firm’s sail”). In the opposite case, where an aggressive behavior from the purchaser
increases lobbying (Bex > 0), the leading purchaser chooses to restrict campaigning to avoid “adding fuel to the fire”. Denote the case
where the purchaser is leader (and the firm follower) by ðeF ;xLÞ. It now follows that xL > ðÞ xS as dedx < ðÞ0 and eF  eS where equality
appears when Bex ¼ 0. Now, inserting the values for e and x into equation (11), gives us a contract price denoted P*ðeF ;xLÞ.4.3. The firm as leader





> ð Þ0 as Bex < ðÞ0 (18)
This implies that the purchaser, if the marginal impact on the political costs from lobbying is weakened (strengthened) as cam-
paigning is increased, will increase (decrease) campaigning as lobbying becomes higher. This means that e and x, from the firm’s
perspective, are strategic complements (substitutes) because a more (less) aggressive behavior by the firm induces the purchaser to react








 ge ¼ 0 (19)
From comparing (15) and (19) it follows that the marginal gain from lobbying is lower (higher) in the case where the firm is leader
compared with the simultaneous case when dxde > ðÞ0. This is because the purchaser will increase (decrease) campaigning when
lobbying is stepped up, which again, when the firm acts as leader, reduces (increases) the marginal gain from lobbying. Hence, the firm
as leader, chooses to use less (more) resources in lobbying relatively to the simultaneous case. Denote this case by ðeL;xFÞ. Then it follows
that eL < ðÞ eS as dxde > ðÞ0 and xF  xS, where the equality appears when Bex ¼ 0: Using (11), the value of the contract price for this
case can now be determined. Denote the price of the new drug when the firm acts as leader (and the purchaser as follower) by P*ðeL;xFÞ.
5. A comparison of the three positioning games
In the following we compare the outcomes from the games of section 4. The games give the same results when the marginal political
costs from lobbying is unaffected by campaigning. This means if Bex ¼ 0, the order of moves in the positioning game is irrelevant, i.e.
xF ¼ xS ¼ xL and eL ¼ eS ¼ eF . Hence, in the following, when comparing possible outcomes of the games, we first consider the case
where Bex < 0 and thereafter the case where Bex > 0. However, before doing so we sum up the findings arrived at from (16) and (18)
saying that the strategic properties of the two influential activities are depending on both the sign of the cross partial derivative of the
political cost function and the decision-maker in question.
Result 4: When the marginal political costs in lobbying decrease in campaigning, Bex < 0; campaigning and lobbying, seen from the pur-
chaser’s perspective, become strategic substitutes, while from the firm’s perspective they become strategic complements. When the marginal po-
litical costs in lobbying increase with campaigning, Bex > 0; campaigning and lobbying seen from the firm’s perspective become strategic27 The second order condition in this case is: W1xx ¼  ð1  βÞ
"








 ð1 þ λÞkxx < 0. In our further discussions, we
presume that this condition is satisfied.
28 The second order condition for this case is π1ee ¼ 1β1þλ
"








 gee < 0. Our discussion is based on the presumption
that this condition holds.
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independent meaning that the order of moves has no consequence for the outcome of the positioning game.
When campaigning reduces the marginal political cost from lobbying, Bex < 0, we get
xF < xS < xL and eL < eS and eF < eS (20a)
and when campaigning increases the marginal political cost from lobbying, Bex > 0, we get
eF < eS < eL and xL < xS and xF < xS (20b)
The rankings in (20a) say that when the marginal impact from lobbying is decreasing in campaigning, lobbying will be lower in both
non-simultaneous games relatively to the simultaneous game. However, we do not know whether it will be lowest in the case where the
purchaser acts as leader or when the firm acts as leader. Moreover, the purchaser will spend least resources in campaigning if acting as
follower and most resources if acting as leader. The rankings in (20b) say that when the marginal impact from lobbying is increasing
with campaigning, campaigning will be lower in both non-simultaneous games relatively to the simultaneous game. However, we do not
know whether it will be lowest in the case where the purchaser acts as leader or when the firm acts as leader. Moreover, the firm spends
least resources in lobbying if acting as follower and most resources if acting as leader.
When Bex < 0, it follows from (20a) that the purchaser both has a first and second mover advantage (Gal-Or, 1985).30 To see this
notice that the purchaser’s utility is decreasing with lobbying, i.e.W1e ¼ ∂W
1
∂e ¼  ð1  βÞBe < 0. By being leader, the purchaser chooses
a high x, forcing the firm to set a low e. This strategy is better than simultaneous moves. An awaiting behavior, however, where the firm
first chooses lobbying, means that the lobbying intensity will be relatively low in order to reduce x, which again is favorable for the
purchaser. Such an awaiting behavior is also preferred by the purchaser relatively to the outcome of the simultaneous game. However,
whether the first or the second mover’s position is the best one for the purchaser depends on whether or not the first (second) mover
advantage dominates the second (first) mover advantage. Consequently, for Bex < 0, using (20a), we arrive at the following inequalities:
W1ðeL; xFÞ > W1eS; xS; W1ðeF ; xLÞ>W1eS; xS;W1ðeL; xFÞ< ð> ÞW1ðeF ; xLÞ (21a)
For the firm there is an unambiguous ranking, where the leading position is better than moving simultaneously that again is better
than acting as a follower. Using (20a), combined with the fact that firm profit decreases with campaigning, i.e. π1x ¼ ∂π
1
∂x ¼ 1β1þλBx < 0, the
firm ranking becomes;
πðeL; xFÞ > πeS; xS> πðeF ; xLÞ (22a)
When Bex > 0, the situation is symmetric to the one described above. Now from (20b) the firm has both a first and second mover
advantage (Gal-Or, 1985) since the firm’s profits decrease with campaigning, i.e. π1x ¼ ∂π
1
∂x ¼ 1β1þλBx < 0: By becoming the leader, the firm
chooses a high e, forcing the purchaser to set a low x. This strategy is better than simultaneous moves. However, an awaiting behavior,
where the purchaser first chooses campaigning, means that campaigning will be relatively low in order to reduce e, which again is
favorable for the firm. Such an awaiting behavior is also better than the outcome from the simultaneous game. However, whether the
first or the secondmover’s position is preferred by the firm is ambiguous since depending on whether the first (second) mover advantage
dominates the second (first) mover advantage. Consequently, for Bex > 0, using (20b), we arrive at the following inequalities
π1ðeL; xFÞ > π1eS; xS; π1ðeF ; xLÞ> π1eS; xS; π1ðeL; xFÞ> ð< Þπ1ðeF ; xLÞ (21b)
For the purchaser the ranking is unambiguous. Now the leading position is better than moving simultaneously that again is better
than acting as follower. Using (20b), and that fact that purchaser’s utility decreases with lobbying, i.e.W1e ¼ ∂W
1
∂e ¼  ð1  βÞBe < 0, the
ranking becomes
WðeL; xFÞ > WeS; xS>WðeF ; xLÞ (22b)
Result 5:When the marginal political costs in lobbying decrease (increase) with campaigning, Bex < 0 ðBex > 0Þ the purchaser (the firm) has
both a first and a second mover advantage while the firm (the purchaser) has a first mover advantage and a second mover disadvantage. It is
ambiguous whether the purchaser’s (firm’s) first or second mover advantage dominates.3129 The asymmetric strategic properties concerning lobbying and campaigning are different from what we find in standard duopoly theory. For
instance, when firms produce goods being substitutes in demand, Cournot competition gives the quantities as strategic substitutes for both agents
while Bertrand competition gives the prices as strategic complements for both firms, see Bulow et al. (1985).
30 Unlike Gal-Or (1985), who only compares the two different non-simultaneous equilibria in a one-stage two-agent model and ranks these two
outcomes, we have also deduced and ranked the possible simultaneous equilibrium. Hence, we are able to identify and define games where there at
the same time exist first and second mover advantages when comparing the non-simultaneous cases to the simultaneous one. Particularly, in games
with asymmetric strategic properties, as in our model, such rankings become interesting.
31 The ranking asymmetry between the purchaser and the firm is different from what we find in standard duopoly theory where, given firms that
produce substitutes, Cournot duopoly competition gives a first mover advantage for both firms while Bertrand competition gives a second mover
advantage for both, see Gal-Or (1985).
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acting as follower, i.e. eL  eF , we know that the purchaser’s second mover advantage will dominate the first mover advantage, i.e.
W1ðeL; xFÞ > W1ðeF ; xLÞ: Since knowing that the firm as leader benefits from moderate lobbying, we arrive at a response where the
purchaser prefers moderate campaigning. Hence, we have a situation where both parties save resources in the positioning game
compared to other possible equilibria. However, if the purchaser’s first mover advantage dominates the second mover advantage, this
could possibly lead to a race towards becoming the first mover that again may lead to the unfavorable simultaneous game. When the
purchaser realizes this, it might be reasonable to expect that also in such cases the purchaser will prefer to play the more favorable game
of being the follower. In the opposite case where Bex > 0, the purchaser as leader chooses a campaigning level being lower to (or equal)
the level chosen if the firm acts as leader, i.e. xL  xF , the firm’s second mover advantage will always dominate his first mover
advantage, i.e. π1ðeL; xFÞ < π1ðeF ; xLÞ: Consequently, the purchaser as leader will benefit from choosing relatively moderate cam-
paigning that again induces the firm to choose relatively moderate lobbying. Hence, we have a situation where both parties save re-
sources in the positioning game compared to other possible equilibria. If the firm’s first mover advantage dominates the second mover
advantage, onemight expect a race for becoming the leader that ends up with outcomes similar to the simultaneous game.When the firm
realizes this, it seems reasonable that the firm will prefer acting as follower to avoid the less favorable outcome of the simultaneous
game.
Result 6: If the marginal political costs in lobbying decrease (increase) with campaigning, Bex < 0 ðBex > 0Þ; both parties prefer the firm
(purchaser) to act as leader when the purchaser’s (firm’s) second mover advantage dominates the purchaser’s (firm’s) first mover advantage.
Particularly, this will hold if the firm (purchaser) acting as leader chooses a level of lobbying (campaigning) that is lower or equal to the level
chosen if acting as follower, eL  eFðxL  xFÞ. Generally, when the purchaser’s (firm’s) first mover advantage dominates the purchaser’s (firm’s)
second mover advantage, the purchaser (the firm) may choose to act as a follower to avoid a race to become leader that will result in the un-
favorable simultaneous game.32
Now it is possible to compare and discuss the contract prices in the different games. When Bex < 0, based on the political cost
function and the rankings in (20a), it is seen that the price, for the case where the purchaser acts as leader, is lower than the price that
follows from the simultaneous game, i.e. P*ðeF ; xLÞ < P*ðeS; xSÞ: Moreover, if the lobbying activity is lower, when the firm acts as fol-
lower relatively to the case where it acts as leader, eF  eL, the political costs and the price become lowest when acting as follower, i.e.
BðeF ; xLÞ < BðeL; xFÞ and P*ðeF ;xLÞ < P*ðeL;xFÞ. If Bex > 0; it follows from the political cost function and the rankings in (20b) that the
price for the case where the firm acts as leader, is higher than the price for the simultaneous case, i.e. P*ðeS;xSÞ < P*ðeL;xFÞ. Additionally,
if campaigning is lower if the purchaser act as follower, relatively to when acting as leader, i.e. xF  xL, the political costs and the price
are both lower when the purchaser is acting as follower, i.e. BðeF ; xLÞ < BðeL; xFÞ and P*ðeF ;xLÞ < P*ðeL;xFÞ.
Result 7: The contract price that arises from the simultaneous game is higher (lower) than the contract price that arises when the purchaser
(firm) acts as a leader when Bex < 0 ð Bex > 0Þ . The contract price that follows from the firm acting as leader is always higher than the contract
price arising from the firm acting as follower when we have cases where Bex < 0 and eF  eL or cases where Bex > 0 and xF  xL.
6. Discussion
Theworldwidemarket for pharmaceuticals is projected to grow from around $1 trillion in 2015 to $1.3 trillion by 2020, representing
an annual growth rate of 4.9 percent (ITA, 2016) and the annual R&D investments of this sector amounts to USD 120 billion representing
17.7% of the R&D expenditures of the world (European Commission, 2012). Additionally, a new generation of drugs (innovative drugs)
now enters the markets (Roughead et al., 2007).33 According to the European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations
there are over 7000 medicines in development for treatment of cancer, diabetes, hepatitis C, cardio-vascular diseases and neurological
conditions (Efpia, 2015). Parallel to the growth in the number of innovative drugs we observe structural reforms in the sense that
institutions that govern pharmaceutical prices are changing. For instance, bilateral negotiations between pharmaceutical companies and
procurement organizations have gained importance at the expense of traditional price-determining institutions such as reference pricing
and tendering approaches. This is especially so for newly registered hospital medicines intended to treat serious or life-threatening
conditions, drugs that demonstrate a potential to address unmet medical needs and drugs against auto-immune diseases.34 Persson32 In symmetric games, like in Cournot and Bertrand duopolies, the firm’s strategies are symmetric. In Cournot they may compete to become the
leader, and may end up in the simultaneous game, while in Bertrand they are both in favor of playing an awaiting behavior, and may end up in
drawing prices simultaneously. In competing in quantities both players will, in the simultaneous case, end up with their second best alternative, while
the simultaneous case when competing in prices is the worst alternative for both. Unlike our asymmetric case above, where it from the players’
ranking of outcomes seems likely that the firm (purchaser) becomes the leader and the purchaser (firm) the follower, there might be “more am-
biguity” in the Bertrand case in how the agents could coordinate in order to avoid the unfavorable simultaneous outcome.
33 In the US, innovative (specialty) drugs represent 1% of total prescriptions but accounts for 25% of total prescription drug spending (Express
Scripts, 2015) and since 2010, one out of every two FDA approvals is an innovative drug (Lotvin et al., 2014). OECD (2015) defines specialty
medications as the drugs entering the market with increasingly high prices and includes most injectable and biologic agents used to treat complex
conditions (rheumatoid arthritis, multiple sclerorsis, cancer).
34 Hospital medicines include all pharmaceuticals administered in a hospital setting, whether in-patient or out-patient departments (COWI, 2009).
On average this group makes up between 10 and 15% of the total market in OECD countries (OECD, 2008). In many countries the selection, pro-
curement, pricing and distribution of such medicines are radically different to the supply chain that operates in the retail sector (Brereton, 1999;
Leopold et al., 2008; Hostenkamp, 2017).
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towards a higher degree of centralization of procurement decisions. A reflection of this trend is the recent initiation taken by the Danish
and Norwegian governments by signing a letter of intent that confirms that they will develop the conditions for joint negotiations on the
same time as inviting other governments to join this initiative.35
It is not obvious what the price effects from centralization and bilateral negotiations will be. On the one hand, such changes may
strengthen the position of the pharmaceutical firms since allowing for price discrimination across countries. On the other hand, more
centralized purchasing could mean a transfer of power to the demand side that provides benefits in terms of volume discounts. We also
observe that the reimbursement decisions as concerning the new, sometimes extremely costly, drugs attract more attention. It is our
clear impression that the public debates on pharmaceutical pricing and affordability have intensified recent years and we observe that
the decision not to reimburse comes under intense criticism of various stakeholders.
In order to obtain a better understanding of the various developments described above, we have proposed a model with an explicit
treatment of lobbying and campaigning, prior to price negotiations, as activities that may influence future voter behavior and in this way
affecting the political burden of not introducing innovative drugs. In a static perspective, the influential activities of our model represent
directly unproductive investments (wasteful activities). Hence, one may think that the parties realize this and go directly to negotiations
(rule out the positioning game). If so, the resources in lobbying and campaigning are saved, i.e. moving directly to the bargaining stage
means a Pareto-improvement. However, if the parties move directly to the bargaining stage there is also a possibility that lobbying and
campaigning might occur if no agreement is reached (an ex post blaming game). Lobbying and campaigning then affect the political
costs thus representing threats in the ongoing negotiations. However, such threats might be non-credible since the potential gains of the
influencing activities will disappear when negotiations break down while the costs of the same activities, at least for the firm, remain.
Hence, playing an ex post blaming game seems less realistic. Moreover, even in situations when there is a common understanding of the
gains from playing an ex post blaming game, it is not likely that such a game will appear. Prior to the bargaining, each party will be
tempted to realize own gains by starting to invest into influencing activities (prisoner’s dilemma). For instance, for any level of cam-
paigning (including a campaigning level equal to zero), the firm has an incentive to start lobbying as long as the marginal profit in
lobbying is positive, i.e. π1e ¼ 1β1þλBe  ge > 0 (if the profit-increase, due to an extra effort in lobbying, is positive). This will be the case
when the increase in the political costs produces an increase in the negotiated price which dominates the costs of lobbying. Moreover,
the monopsony will have an incentive to start campaigning, for any level of lobbying, prior to the negotiations, as long as its marginal
utility is increasing in campaigning, i.e. W1x ¼ ð1βÞBx  ð1þλÞkx > 0 (when the reduction in the negotiated price that follows from
reduced political costs means a revenue increase which dominates the increase in campaigning costs).
Given a dynamic perspective, however, investments into influential activities could in principle be welfare-improving. This is
possible if the dynamic incentives (innovation) were distorted for example through suboptimal patent lengths and widths. If so, ne-
gotiations could improve welfare relatively to other pricing models (monopolistic pricing). It is also possible that influential activities
can be beneficial via their effect on the contract price of the new drug. For instance, our analysis predicts that low firm lobbying levels
and high purchaser campaigning levels may lead to relatively low prices. On the other hand, one might get an outcome where the price
of a new medicine is relatively high, and such a price level could be better for the purchaser due to saved resources in the positioning
game. In this perspective it is worth noticing that as long as the firmmakes use of lobbying to produce political costs, the purchaser’s best
response is not to stay passive, but to use campaigning to reduce the political costs that arise from lobbying. The most likely games
produce values of lobbying and campaigning that are modest compared to other games considered. Despite this, depending on tech-
nology (voter sensitivity and costs), the investments into such activities may well be significant. It should also be remarked that lobbying
and campaigning seen in a dynamic perspective, where the voters initially are imperfectly informed, may potentially work as an
effective channel for the exchange of relevant information related to the new medicine.
Ourmodel ignores some factors that potentially could affect the outcomeof negotiations. First, wedonot consider the possibility of the
negotiating parties to meet in future periods. To the extent that pharmaceuticals demand uptake for other medicines in later periods, this
may represent an opportunity for both parties to influence the outcome of the present negotiations. Second, we only consider price
contracts althoughprice-volume contracts are also observed. The inclusion of volumemay introduce some additionalflexibility, however,
in a national health system, the target groups are often well-defined (inclusion criteria), thus price contracts and price-volume contracts
are likely to converge. Third, in our model reasoning we have ignored any connections between voters’ valuations of the existing and the
new medicine and the purchaser’s valuations, however, it is a possibility that the purchaser might be influenced by voters’ valuations.
In many countries, purchasing decisions are supported by cost-effectiveness analysis to assess whether a given technology provides
sufficient “value for the money”. On the same time, most countries seem to prefer not to have explicit cost-effectiveness thresholds.
Important reasons are the value given to other dimensions such as patient group characteristics (burden of disease, low initial quality of
life, severity and duration of life), whether or not other treatment options are available, the innovative nature of the technology and
uncertainty considerations. Our analysis suggests that the lack of clarity might be a rational response to complex political environments
in the sense that the absence of explicit criteria leaves policymakers with a flexibility to handle the political pressure that arises in
connection with reimbursement decisions. In order to develop our knowledge on pharmaceutical pricing in bilateral markets such
factors should be included in future works.3635 The press release on the Nordic procurement deal to secure lower medicine prices is available at http://www.regjeringen.no/n0/dep/hod/id421.
36 A somewhat different avenue of future research would be to study the timing of firm’s decisions to launch new innovative drugs into various
markets.
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bilateral monopoly markets. For both parties, the objectives of negotiations are to influence the outcomes (contract terms) in the di-
rection of own interests. One strategy to achieve this, prior to negotiations, is to take part in positioning games. Such cases are likely
when a government negotiates with firms that exclusively supply products such as armaments, transport services or other goods and
services for which voters have an explicit interest in the negotiated outcome (e.g. prices, funding, locations, quality and employment).
Empirical research on bilateral monopoly situations should focus on the conditions affecting political benefits and costs, as well as
characteristics of the firm and the purchaser, in order to further clarify the connection between pricing and ongoing positioning and
negotiation games. Given pharmaceuticals, hypotheses that could be tested is the role of the type of political technology (“add fuel to the
fire” or “take the wind out of the rivals’) and the perceived effects that lobbying and campaigning (voters’ sensitivity) have on the order
of moves, lobbying spendings, and negotiated prices. However, as often is the case for lobbying studies, in contrast to for example studies
on campaign contributions, significant data constraints prevail making econometric testing challenging. In the case of pharmaceuticals
the negotiated prices are typically confidential and lobbying costs are difficult to observe since stakeholders are not required to disclose
such information. In addition, lobbying investments take many forms such as support (financial and in-kind) to consumer groups
(patient associations), the use of external consulting services and support from industry associations in grabbing the attention of the
public. An interesting observation is that purchasers (public agencies) seem to have increased their capacity in the fields of public affairs,
public relations and communication. However, the separation of such campaigning investments that belong to a particular case
(negotiation) appears to be challenging. In addition, the case specific character of negotiations in connection with a particular inno-
vative drug makes sample size a problem.37 Given this, a more promising avenue for future research on pharmaceutical markets might
be the use of case studies that combines quantitative and qualitative methodologies. Interviews with various stakeholders (such as
consumer groups, pharmaceutical firms, pharmaceutical industry associations, healthcare decision makers and opinion leaders among
health care workers), records and media articles may in principle provide valuable insights into the strategic considerations made.38 By
referring to a specific case concerning price negotiations for the medicine Edaravone, Nyland and Pettersen (2018) describe and discuss
the roles played by the Norwegian purchaser organization, a pharmaceutical firm and the media.39,40 For this particular case they
describe a positioning game prior to the negotiations, although not observing essential data, that is analogous to the assumption made
for the model analyzed here.
7. Conclusion
In exchange situations, such as negotiations, the parties engage in mutually beneficial trades since having a common interest to
cooperate, however, they also have conflicting interests over the terms of trade. In addition, the stakeholders need not be limited to
those actually participating in the negotiations. For example if one of the parties is a governmental representative, voters become
stakeholders. This means, for heterogeneous voter preferences, that a positioning game might take place prior to the negotiations to
influence actual outcomes. In this paper we propose a model that focuses on negotiations and the strategic interactions between
pharmaceuticals and purchaser organizations where voters are stakeholders. The model is concerned with the outcome of bilateral price
negotiations between a firm, that enters a market with a new patented drug, and a purchaser organization (e.g. a centralized
government-controlled payer or group purchasing groups). The model yields insights about pharmaceutical pricing and generates
hypotheses about factors that determine prices.
First, we introduce a political cost function that depends on the difference in the number of voters being supporters and non-
supporters of a particular agreement. The voters are concerned with treatment effects and the opportunity costs of the drug in ques-
tion and are influenced by arguments (lobbying and campaigning) presented to them by the negotiating parties. Second, we identify
factors that impact the negotiated price in a Nash bargaining game. The price, being a function of the influential activities (campaigning
and lobbying), becomes the average of the firm’s unit costs of production and the purchaser’s valuation of the net utility gain per patient
from replacing the existing treatment with the new medicine. The price increases with the unit drug cost of the existing treatment, with
the purchaser’s valuation, relative to the existing one, of the new treatment, and the price of the old drug, while it decreases with the
marginal cost of public funding and the bargaining power of the purchaser. When the patient group size becomes higher, the price can
both increase and decrease. Third, we analyze the impact political environments might have on the negotiated prices. The investments
into lobbying and campaigning depend on factors such as the investment costs of the two activities, voters’ sensitivity to such activities,
and strategic interrelationships between the activities. Based on this conceptual model, we have seen that likely positioning games are
those where one of the two negotiating parties acts as leader while the rival acts as follower. Such games produce values of lobbying and
campaigning that are modest compared to other games considered.37 However, in other areas where the negotiated outcomes and the influential activities are more readily observable than in the case of price
bargaining for new medicines, it could be easier to observe essential information and apply statistical methodologies to analyze political cost
functions of the type presented in our study.
38 Two examples of drugs that have received massive media attention in Norway the last few years are Ipilmumab and Spinraza. According to the
archives of Retriever, Scandinavias largest agency for media monitoring and analysis, these two drugs have been mentioned more than 3000 times in
Norwegian media articles the last few years (https://www.retriever.no/product/medieovervakning-og-medieanalyse).
39 See Nyland and Pettersen (2018), page 16–17.
40 Edaravone represents a new possible treatment for Amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS).
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